Understanding Germany’s half-hearted support of Ukraine

The article discusses the prevailing pro-Russian sentiments in former East Germany and the differing German perspectives on how to respond to the Kremlin's actions, especially in light of the Ukraine conflict.

The article begins by referencing a statement from 2011 by then-Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, who expressed concerns over German inaction in Europe. Fast forward to after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki criticized Germany's half-hearted support for Ukraine. Despite Germany supplying heavy weapons to Ukraine under pressure from NATO allies, skepticism about German reliability persists in Eastern European states.

A key point of the article is the geographical divide in attitudes within Germany itself. Surveys show that Eastern Germans are more pro-Russian compared to their Western counterparts. For instance, only 31% in the former East Germany demand a tougher stance toward Russia, compared to 47% in the former West Germany. Similarly, support for supplying heavy weapons to Ukraine is significantly higher in the West than in the East. This divide is also evident in beliefs about NATO's role in the conflict and the perception of Ukraine as part of Russia.

The article explores reasons behind these differing attitudes. In Eastern Europe, historical experiences such as the double occupation by Germany and Russia during World War II, and the suppression of uprisings by Russian troops, have deeply influenced public opinion. However, in former East Germany, such traumatic experiences were less consequential. Additionally, the positive attitudes in Eastern Germany towards Russia are partly attributed to the era of Mikhail Gorbachev and subsequent disappointment with the West post-reunification. This has resulted in a more anti-Western than pro-Russian stance.

Another aspect discussed is the deep-rooted anti-Americanism in Germany, especially in the East, a legacy of GDR propaganda. This sentiment is particularly strong among voters of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Left Party, both of which have their greatest voter potential in the new federal states. The article also touches on the influence of Russian networks in Eastern Germany and the complex national identity issues faced by many Germans in the East.

Regarding German foreign policy, the article notes the country's evolution from a middle power during the Cold War to seeking a more independent role post-reunification. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 highlighted Germany's continued dependence on its alliance with the U.S.

The article concludes by suggesting that the direction of German foreign policy and the influence of the "peace movement" in Germany, particularly in the East, will largely depend on the course of the war in Ukraine. If Ukrainian forces demonstrate the capability to defeat Russian invaders, the influence of those advocating a tougher stance against Russia may grow. Conversely, if the conflict stagnates or escalates, pressure may increase on the German government to push Ukraine towards ceasefire negotiations without Russian concessions.